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The following are a few examples of Massachusetts Court Decisions in the area of OUI.
In Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 24 (1928), the court defined the term operation of a motor vehicle.
In Commonwealth v. Smithson, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 545 (1996), it was determined that a gated road leading to a commercial gravel pit was not a "public way" which is one of the elements of the crime of OUI.
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169 (1985), discusses the standard of intoxication in Mass. OUI cases, whether the DUI defendant's capacity to operate the motor vehicle was diminished as a result of alcohol or drugs.
Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327 (1997); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ayre, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 17 (1991) all discuss the legal principle that most OUI field sobriety tests are not "testimonial" in that they test physical coordination but do not require revelation of subjective knowledge or thoughts concerning any fact. Therefore, they do not violate the driver's privilege against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774 (1995), states that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests cannot be used against the driver in a Mass. DUI trial.
In Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 294 (1998), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided that, in DUI cases, the police can administer field sobriety tests and the police do not have to give Miranda warnings or inform the driver that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests cannot be used against the driver. Commonwealth v. Wholley, 429 Mass. 1010 (1999) and VanHouton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327 (1997) also state that Miranda rights do not have to be given at roadside.
In Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184 (1997), the highest court in Massachusetts decided that the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test requires expert testimony in order to be admissible.
The case of Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850) defines "reasonable doubt" in the context of a jury trial. The Webster case states that “[i]t is not enough for the [government] to establish a probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant is more likely to be guilty than not guilty. That is not enough.”
The following Mass. OUI court decisions prevent the prosecution from using a breath test refusal against the DUI defendant at trial Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994); Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201 (1992); Commonwealth v. Conroy, 396 Mass. 266 (1985); Commonwealth v. Scott, 359 Mass. 407 (1971).
Commonwealth v. Brazelton, 404 Mass. 783 (1989) states that a person arrested for DWI in Massachusetts has the legal right to be notified of the consequences of a chemical test refusal but not the consequences of a breathalyzer failure. Also, there is no legal right to consult with a lawyer when deciding whether to take or refuse the breathalyzer.
The cases of Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453 (2001) and Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809 (2007), discuss the use of retrograde extrapolation in Mass. DUI cases.
The case of Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 348 (1987) allows a DUI defendant to have an expert witness testify about the accuracy of the breathalyzer.
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